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Prodipto Ghosh, Secretary, Ministry of Environment & Forests asked me
to prepare a paper on Global Public Goods for the Core Group on
Sustainable Development.  I   delivered a lecture at ICSSR on this topic
on March 15, 2004.  I am grateful to P. Ghosh, S. Dasgupta, B. Desai and
S. Mitra of the Core Group, and A. Bagchi, M. G. Rao, V.L. Kelkar and
V. R. Panchamukhi for their comments and suggestions. This paper was
revised in March 2008.1
1. Introduction
Recognition of the interdependencies characterizing the Earth
(a global common) and the globalization phenomenon necessitate
collective actions at the global level to solve multilateral issues in trade,
finance, environment, spread of infectious diseases and security.  There
is also growing awareness that the existing institutional arrangements to
solve multilateral issues exhibit signs of adaptive (dynamic) inefficiency,
with institutional changes lagging behind rapidly evolving realities as
manifested in growing tensions in reaching cooperative solutions.
An International Task Force on Global Public Goods was
constituted in 2003 to identify relevant international public goods from a
perspective of reducing poverty and to study the provision and financing
issues.  See International Task Force on Global Public Goods (2006).
This Task Force has identified the following priority global public goods
(GPGs): (a) preventing the emergence and spread of infectious disease,
(b) tackling climate change, (c) enhancing international financial stability,
(d) strengthening the international trading system, (e) achieving peace
and security, and (f) generating knowledge.
We need a framework for defining, identifying, providing and
financing GPGs.  Section 2 reviews alternative approaches to defining
GPGs.  Section 3 classifies GPGs into two categories: pure global public
goods and global public goods by global public choice.  Section 4 considers
delivery systems for GPGs.  It assesses the existing institutional
frameworks for the supply of pure GPGs through the lens of GPG framework
developed by Kaul et al (2003).  Then it considers the division of labour
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among stakeholders at global, national and state levels using the
Subsidiarity Principle.  Finally, it suggests some changes in the delivery
system for an efficient provision of GPGs.  Section 5 explores the financing
options. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2. Definition of GPG
We review briefly three attempts to define public goods:
a. Samuelson (1954)
Even though the concept of public good is old in economic
literature, Samuelson developed the concept   in a rigorous manner.
According to him a pure public good must satisfy two features: non-
rivalry in consumption and non-excludability.  Non-rivalry means that
consumption of the good by one person does not decrease its availability
to others (e.g. knowledge, defense).  Non-excludability means that the
good is available to all; it is impossible to exclude any one from consuming
the good.  Samuelson’s aim was to determine the optimum mix of public
and private goods based on the economic efficiency criterion.1  As the
marginal cost of supplying a public good is zero, economic efficiency
requires that the good is supplied at zero price.  Therefore, we need a
non-market mechanism, for example, public provision of a public good.
As the good is available free of cost, an individual has no incentive to
reveal his true preference for the good.  Hence the free rider problem
arises.  A limitation of the theory is that it does not deal with the equity
issue.
1  According to Pareto an economic allocation is efficient if by any reallocation it is
impossible to improve the welfare of at least one individual without decreasing the
welfare of others3
In this framework GPG is defined as a public good whose benefits
are available globally.
b. World Bank, Development Committee (2000)
It defines GPGs as commodities, services and systems of rules
or policy regimes with substantial cross-border externalities that are
important for development and poverty reduction and can be supplied in
sufficient supply only through cooperation and collective action by
developed and developing countries.  The above definition does not
mention features like non-rivalry and non-exclusion, but it is useful for a
practitioner interested in funding development projects which aim at
poverty reduction.
c. UNDP, Office of Development Studies
Kaul, Conceicau, Goulven and Mendoza (2003) provide the
following definitions of public goods:
(i) Goods have a special potential for being public if they have non-
excludable benefits, nonrival benefits, or both.
(ii) Goods are de facto public if they are nonexclusive and available
for all to consume.
GPGs are goods with benefits that extend to all countries, people
and generations.
(i) Weakens Samuelson’s definition, and (ii) does not require
non-rivalry.  Hence, a private good can be put in a public domain by
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public choice (a socially determined process) because it is a merit good,
a basic need or a right.  [See Desai for a historical perspective (2003)].
The aim of the authors is to refurbish the concept of GPG.
According to them the need arises because (i) public goods are provided
by individuals, communities, nations and via international cooperation;
(ii) public participation is essential in the determination of levels of the
goods; (iii) accrual of benefits depend on capacities and costs of access
of different groups; and (iv) special problems of developing countries.
They introduce the concept of “triangle of publicness”, that is,
publicness in consumption, publicness in decision making and publicness
in distribution of net benefit.  This concept is used to evaluate the structure
of international institutions, decision making processes, framing and
enforcement of rules, and distribution of net benefits among member
nations.
We prefer Samuelson’s definition of public goods.  However,
Kaul et al definition of de facto public goods is relevant if the global
community commits to provision of certain merit goods via collective
action.  Their concept of triangle of publicness is also useful in designing
a fair institutional mechanism for the supply of GPGs.
3. Identification and Classification of GPGs
GPGs can be classified on the basis of different principles: broad
features and supply conditions, aggregation technologies and geographical
range.5
We may consider two categories of GPGs keeping in view their
features and supply conditions.
a. Pure GPGs satisfy the features of non-rivalry in consumption and
non-excludability.  Examples of pure GPGs are knowledge, ozone
restoration, reduction of green house gases, biodiversity, sound
trading regime, financial market stability, and global governance.
All persons benefit, may be in varying degrees depending on their
capacities and preferences.  The cost of provision does not increase
with the number benefited.  International cooperation and collective
action are necessary to solve the free rider problem.
b. Goods are put in the public domain because of global consensus.
Examples: poverty eradication, access to safe drinking water, access
to sanitation, compulsory primary education.  The goods may be
private goods in the sense they possess the features of rivalry and
excludability but they are put in the public domain by global
community.  The rationale for this choice, in individualist tradition, is
based on positive externality or being a merit good or simply altruism.
From the viewpoint of communitarian (German) tradition, these wants
transcend individual likes and dislikes and everyone is entitled to
supply of the goods.  Unlike the case of pure public good, the cost of
provision increases with the number covered.  The target group has
to be identified and full coverage of members of the target group is
necessary to realize the goal.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are based on the UN
Millennium Declaration, 2000.  The UN General Assembly has approved
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the goals and targets.  It may be seen from Table 1 that most of the
goods and services needed to achieve the MDGs come under the category
GPG by global public choice.
If we classify GPGs on the basis of aggregation technology then
the following categories of technology emerge:
 Weighted sum technology: In this case the provision of the public
good received by country i is the weighted sum of the provisions of
the public good by various countries, the weights being the proportions
of the good produced by the respective countries which are consumed
by country i. Put very simply, the total amount of the good consumed
by country i is the sum of the quantities provided to it by the various
countries. Sulfur emissions received by a country follow this
technology.
 Best-shot technology: In the case of this technology the amount of
the public good received by each region/ country depends upon the
maximum resource contribution which is made by a production agent.
For example, assume that ten different production agents in ten
different countries are spending money on research to discover an
AIDS vaccine. Given the large monetary and time costs involved in
this research, it is only the expenditure of the largest agent that
might matter. This has some implications for international cooperation.
It is very clear that countries must collaborate to form research
consortia to tackle the pressing medical and scientific problems in
this world.  This will help them to gain the maximum social returns
from their joint expenditure.7
 Weakest Link Technology: In this case the amount of the global public
good/ bad consumed by each country depends on the technology of
the weakest link. If a country has very poor arrangements to contain
contagious diseases then irrespective of the arrangements made by
other countries the latter might suffer in the presence of porous
borders delineating countries. Thus, it is essential through a system
of financial disincentives and rewards to ensure the compliance of
each country with certain minimum health standards.
 Summation technology: This technology implies that the total supply
of a public good is the sum of supplies by all countries. Consumption
of the good might be rival or non-rival, excludable or non-excludable.
But if both these characteristics are present then the action of any
one country affects the well –being of other countries and there are
bound to be certain problems of international coordination.
PGs can also be classified according to their geographical range
or spillover area. This is the range or area over which their benefits or
disbenefits are felt. On the basis of their range we might classify these
goods into local (benefits affecting a small locality), national (pertaining
to a nation), regional (relating to groups of nations) and global (pertaining
to the entire world). Thus, garbage dumped by a person is a local public
bad as the stench affects only a small locality. The donation made by a
rich person to a public park falls under the same category.  Defense
expenditure leads to a feeling of security, which is a public good for the
entire nation.  A trade block is a regional good as it benefits a group of
nations. Green house gas emission is a global public bad as it affects
people all over the globe.
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4. Delivery Systems for GPGs
We consider three issues: (a) the extent to which the existing
institutional framework fulfils the expectations for the delivery of GPGs,
(b) the Subsidiarity Principle, and (c) possible changes in the delivery
system to achieve economic efficiency/cost minimization.
a. Problems in Existing Institutional Framework
It is worth examining the functioning of the institutional framework
in the provision of a few GPGs through the lens of the GPG framework
developed by Kaul et al.
The World Trading Organization (WTO) is hailed as a transparent,
democratic and fair trading regime. WTO has now 151 members and
this member nations account for 98 percent of world trade.  WTO
agreements recognize the Rio principles of ‘special situation and needs
of developing countries’ (Principle 6) and ‘states have common but
differentiated responsibilities’ (Principle 7), but principle 12 ‘trade policy
measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade’ is violated because many developed countries use
non-tariff barriers such as tighter environmental standards, labour
standards and conformity required with process and production methods.
These regulations are proliferating, more frequent, stringent and complex
(UNCTAD, 2004).  Their commitments toward liberalization of agricultural
trade have not been met. There is also asymmetry in trade liberalization.
While there is considerable liberalization in flow of goods and capital,
there are many barriers to mobility of labour and technology. Many
developing countries lack skills and bargaining powers in rule making9
and modifying trade agreements.  As a result, the anticipated gains from
trade have not accrued to many developing countries.  Mendoza (2003)
concludes that WTO is a GPG only in form but not in substance.
The objective of Framework Convention and Climate Change
(FCCC) is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gases (GHG) concentration
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. GHG reduction is a global public
good.  FCCC takes into account Rio Principle 7, which states, ‘states have
common but differentiated responsibilities’. It also notes that the developed
countries have to bear the responsibility ‘in view of the pressures their
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and
financial resources they command’. But at the implementation stage
problems do arise. The Kyoto Protocol has become operational now but
the US has not yet ratified it. Under the Clean Development Mechanism,
Global Environment Facility funds are reimbursed to developing countries
only on the basis of the incremental cost principle. There is no net benefit
to developing countries, Ghosh (2003).  A cooperative solution based on
individual rationality, coalition rationality and Pareto optimality would
require sharing of net benefits between developed and developing country
parties (see Sankar, 1995). There is also no compensation mechanism
for the past damage.  Creation of global tradable permits and its allocation
on per capita basis or in relation to past damage will be beneficial to
developing countries, Ghosh  (2003).2
2  According to World Development Report 1992, if the rights were allocated on the
basis of population and if the rights were sold at $25 per ton of carbon the
industrialized world would have to pay to developing countries about $70 billion to
afford one year’s emissions at 1988 level.
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The Official Development Aid commitment of 0.7 percent of GDP
of developing countries is yet to be realized; in 2002 it was 0.23 percent
of GDP. Special and differential treatment provisions in the WTO
Agreement and promise of technical and financial assistance to developing
countries in multilateral environmental agreements are only best
endeavour measures and are not mandatory.
The main international treaty dealing with the development and
exploitation of extra-orbital space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which
makes provision for usufruct rights.  The 1979 Moon Treaty is based on
the principle of common heritage of mankind which means that no single
nation or private entity has the right to appropriate commonly-owned
resources.  Marshall (1995) notes that a few technologically elite space-
capable nations would appropriate the commonly-owned resources of
the Solar System for themselves, without any commitment of sharing of
the benefits to non-space capable nations.  Already the global demand
for spectrum and orbital slots exceeds the availability and the latecomers
will find it difficult to launch satellites in the geostationary orbit.
Loss of biodiversity is viewed as a common concern of mankind.
The Convention on Biodiversity has three objectives: (a) conservation of
biodiversity, (b) sustainable use of biological resources, and (c) creation
of an access and benefit sharing regime for biological resources and
associated traditional knowledge. Inclusion of country /source of origin,
prior informed consent, and access and benefit sharing agreements in
applications for patents based on biological resources and associated11
traditional knowledge , will prevent biopiracy and benefit owners/guardians
of the resources in mega-biodiversity countries in the South, but the
TRIPS Council has not accepted the suggestion.
The above examples reveal that development concerns get low
priority in the implementation of treaties/agreements. The WTO Doha
Round of negotiations, commenced in 2001, was aimed at addressing
development concerns of developing countries, but the negotiations are
in stalemate now. We need mechanisms for effective participation by
developing countries, both at the rule making stage and at the
implementation stage, to enable them reap the benefits of multilateral
agreements.
b. Assignment of Functions at Global, Regional and Local Levels
In the provision of GPGs, assignment of responsibilities to different
stakeholders at global, national and local levels is necessary.  Here the
Subsidiarity Principle is relevant.  This Principle assigns decisions and
enforcement to the lowest of government capable of handling it without
significant residual externalities. In case of pure GPGs international
cooperation is needed to set priorities, to identify responsibilities of
developed and developing countries, to reach binding agreements, to
decide financing options and to reach consensus on enforcement
mechanisms.  But even in case of pure GPGs, implementation of many
decisions has to be at national and regional levels.  For example reduction
of GHGs can be achieved by pursuing a variety of policy options e.g.,
afforestation, switch from coal to natural gas in power generation,
substitution of non-conventional energy sources like wind energy and
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solar energy for thermal energy and so on.  The investment decisions
are location-specific.  Similarly in bio-diversity conservation, the
conservation measures have to be region/location-specific.
Apart from the assignment function, an incentive structure is
needed to reach the goals at the least possible cost.  This problem is
important in cases where an activity generates private benefits, local
public benefits and global public benefits.  In some cases there may be
complementarity between private benefits and public benefits.  We need
a mechanism to internalize conservation decisions of private individuals
and forest department.  Reimbursement of costs only on the basis of
incremental global benefits is not adequate to encourage resource
conservation/regeneration (Perrings and Gadgil, 2003).  Effective public
participation is needed to ascertain people’s preferences regarding the
type and level of GPG, peoples’ willingness to pay user charges for merit
goods and their involvement in monitoring/enforcement of the delivery
systems.  Choice of an appropriate institutional framework – public, private,
community or public private partnership – should be based on the criteria
of least cost service provision, given the goals.
c. Changes in Delivery System
Public responsibility in the provision of merit goods does not
necessarily imply public production and supply.  To avoid leakage in
distribution and to ensure adequate supply to the target groups, alternative
delivery mechanisms should be explored.  Food coupon system is an
alternative to Public Distribution System for the supply of essential food
items to the poor.  Similarly, Education Voucher Scheme can be a substitute
for public schools.  One attractive feature of Food Coupon Scheme or13
Education Voucher Scheme is that it provides a choice to the recipient to
choose the shop or the school he/she prefers and thereby creates
competition in the supply systems.
One major problem in achieving universal coverage is the ‘last
mile problem’.  The unit costs of providing utility and other essential
services are higher in rural and remote areas then in urban areas.
Revenue realization per unit of service is also lower in rural areas.  We
need innovative, technical, institutional and management solutions, and
subsidies and cross subsidies to achieve universal coverage. For a
discussion of the problems in dissemination of space technology, see
Sankar (2007).
For monitoring and assessing performance, it is desirable to
move from input based measures such as amount spent on rural water
supply or number of wells/hand pumps erected to outcome based
measures in terms of degree of access, availability of water in different
months, and quality of water.
In case of common property resources, creation of self-governing
institutions with built-in incentive and penalty structures may be needed
to ensure sustainability of the commons (see Ostrom, 1990).
5. Financing Options
The conventional wisdom in public finance is that public funding
is required for financing pure public goods.  In case of pure GPGs also
there is a case for financial support from international institutions and
national governments but application of the principle of common but
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differentiated responsibilities means that the developed countries should
bear greater part of the burden.  When activities generate both private
benefits and public benefits (local and national) there is scope for raising
funds from all the stakeholders.  The financing options along with the
desired uses of funds are given in Table 2.
6. Concluding Remarks
The International Task Force Report on GPGs says that
international cooperation is a tool for altruistic purposes and it serves
geopolitical interests. It is also a tool for nations to align their long-term
enlightened national interests to achieve common goals. Rio Declaration
1992 contains principles for international governance and Agenda 21
gives an action plan. However, despite the establishment of the WTO in
1995, ratification of more than 200 multilateral agreements, and the UN
Millennium Declaration, the pace of international cooperation has been
slow. The factors hindering international cooperation are (a) governments’
unwillingness to accept binding international commitments because they
restrict their policy spaces, (b) political myopia, (c) differences in
preferences and priorities of governments, (d) lack of catalytic leadership,
(e) inadequate funding, and (f) difficulties in creating effective institutions
for implementation of the shared visions. The challenge for countries is
to find ways and means of overcoming the barriers to address the
common concerns of mankind in such a way that every nation finds that
it is better-off via international cooperation than otherwise.15
Table 1: Millennium Development Goals as Global Public Goods
                    Goal           Type of GPG
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Merit goods, GPG by
global public choice.
Achieve universal primary education Merit good, GPG by global
public choice.
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases GPG
Promote gender equity and
empower women GPG
Ensure environmental sustainability
Integrate the principles of SD in the
country policies and reverse the
loss of environmental resources
Halve by 2015 the proportion of people     GPG
without sustainable access to safe
drinking water
By 2020 to have achieved a significant
improvement in the lives of atleast Merit good, GPG by global
100 million slum dwellers public choice.
Develop a Global Partnership for
Development
Develop further an open, rule-based, GPG
predictable, non-discriminatory trading
and financial system
Includes a commitment to good
governance, development, and poverty GPG, Equity
reduction – both nationally
and internationally
Address the special needs of the least
developed/land locked countries and Equity, GPG by global
small developing states public choice
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Table 2: Financing Options:  Sources and Uses
                    Source Use
1. Financial  Assistance from Developed
Countries ODA Poverty  alleviation
Environmental  protection
GEF Environmental Projects in
developing  countries
Through UN agencies Achieving MDGs
2. Public private partnership  at  global To  fight  AIDS,
levelGlobal  Health Fund Tuberculosis and Malaria
3. Global Commons
a. Rent for geostationary orbital space GHG  reduction
Rent for  other global commons GHG  reduction/biodiversity
conservation
b. Carbon emissions tax Reduction in the use  of
fossil fuels
c. User charges
Emission  oriented charge for GHG  reduction
international  airways
Ecologically  differentiated  user Ocean  environmental
charges for  international  seaways management
4. Technology transfer  at  concessional Technological  upgradation
rates modernization in SMEs
a. Environmentally sustainable
technologies
b. Access  to drugs/medicines  covered Supply  to  poor  to  meet
under IPR MDGs
5. Debt-for-nature  swap Biodiversity  conservation
6. Internet  tax Bridge the digital  divide
among  countries.
7. Market  creation
a. Institution of  property  rights for Greenhouse  gas  reduction
green house  gases,  market  creation
and allocation of rights on per
capita basis; allow for trades in rights.
b. Access fees  for biological resources, Biodiversity  conservation
traditional  knowledge  ex-situ benefit sharing  among
conservation  (identify  country stakeholders
of origin)
Note: See Ghosh (2003) for (3) and 4(a) and Schubert (2003) for 4(b).17
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